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The Future Is Today: Preparing the Legal 
Ground for the United States Space Force 
CLAYTON J. SCHMITT* 
The Space Race officially launched on October 4, 1957, when 
the Soviet Union placed Sputnik I, the first man-made satellite, into 
Earth’s orbit. The United States fired back four months later, on 
January 31, 1958, by launching its own satellite, Explorer I. While 
both superpowers’ programs facially focused on scientific research, 
each was funded and directed by their respective militaries. Military 
functions in space followed shortly, with the United States beginning 
to place its first reconnaissance satellites in space in 1959 as part 
of the Corona program. American and Soviet discussions following 
these initial military developments eventually led to the adoption of 
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which severely restricted the types 
of military activities the two powers could conduct either in orbit or 
in the greater reaches of space. The United States has recently cre-
ated a new military branch exclusively focused on space. This new 
branch—the Space Force—will be greatly restricted by those early 
treaties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States created a new military branch for the first time 
in seventy-two years on December 20, 2019—the United States 
Space Force (“Space Force”).1 Officially established as a sub-de-
partment of the United States Air Force (“Air Force”), the Space 
Force has the potential to radically alter the United States’ military 
 
 1 United States Space Force Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 9081–83 (as enacted by the 
President, Dec. 20, 2019). Title 10 of the United States Code was amended to 
authorize the Space Force by the passage of the Fiscal Year 2020 National De-
fense Authorization Act, signed into law by President Trump on Dec. 20, 2019. 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, S.1790, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (enacted).  
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focus.2 The ultimate capabilities of this new force, however, are un-
settled: this new branch can include powerful new warfighting abil-
ities or instead merely amount to a reshuffling of already existing 
military units and other Department of Defense organizations. 
Under the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, better known as the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967 (“Outer Space Treaty”), certain military capabilities 
are seriously restricted in space.3 Part I of this Note will discuss the 
current legal restrictions on military activities, both from the Outer 
Space Treaty and other sources of international law. Part II will 
discuss modern military capabilities as they relate to those re-
strictions. Part III, then, will discuss the structure of the new Space 
Force and what capabilities the branch could provide if the United 
States were to withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. Part IV will 
explore the legal methods of treaty enforcement and treaty with-
drawal, as well as the possible legal and geopolitical repercussions 
the United States must consider in balancing the decision to poten-
tially withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. Finally, this Note 
will conclude by confirming that if the Space Force is to truly be a 
capable and coequal branch of the military, the United States must 
withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty and commit to making this 
new branch the home of unique military capabilities previously un-
realized in any other branch of service. The United States will 
likely have to fight an armed conflict in space4 and must be pre-
pared for such a possibility. So long as the United States remains a 
party to the Outer Space Treaty, however, the Space Force will not 
be able to fully utilize the powerful new military capabilities that 
space can offer. 
 
 2 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, With the Stroke of a Pen, U.S. 
Space Force Becomes a Reality, U.S. AIR FORCE (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2046061/with-the-stroke-of-a-
pen-us-space-force-becomes-a-reality/.  
 3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 4 Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space, 
10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK UNITED NATIONS L. 89, 125 (2006). 
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I. INTERNATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY ACTIONS IN SPACE 
This Part will provide an in-depth analysis of the international 
legal restrictions on military action in space. It will begin with a brief 
overview of the many different international agreements that govern 
space. Next, it will examine each of the provisions of the Outer 
Space Treaty that govern military actions and explore the extent of 
the constraints they establish on military activity. Finally, it will 
close with a discussion of other international law that affects mili-
tary action in space, especially the Law of Armed Conflict 
(“LOAC”). 
While the Outer Space Treaty remains the single most impactful 
international agreement on both military and other uses of space, 
several other treaties and LOAC also play a role in limiting extrater-
restrial military activity.5 The Outer Space Treaty itself covers a va-
riety of topics, although it focuses primarily on two concerns: the 
military use of space6 and national claims to possession of celestial 
bodies (which it explicitly prohibits under Article II).7 The Articles 
covering military use of space will be discussed in Section I.B, infra. 
Commentators generally understand that many of the Outer Space 
Treaty’s provisions are also addressed by other treaties relevant to 
military activities in space, such as the Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space of 1968 (“Rescue and Return Agree-
ment”).8 These Treaties will be discussed in Section I.C, infra, along 
with LOAC and its effects on military actions in space. 
 
 5 Ryan Esparza, Event Horizon: Examining Military and Weaponization Is-
sues in Space By Utilizing the Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict, 
83 J. AIR. L. & COM. 333, 339 (2018); Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the 
Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 99–119 (2000) (list-
ing various agreements that limit military activity in outer space). 
 6 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, arts. IV, IX, X–XII. 
 7 Id. art. II. 
 8 See Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 
672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]; see also Ramey, 
supra note 5, at 87. 
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A. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
The Outer Space Treaty developed from the early space race be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union,9 and its provisions 
resemble a similar non-armament treaty: the Antarctic Treaty.10 The 
United States and Soviet Union signed the Outer Space Treaty in 
early 1967; it took effect later that same year.11 Today, 123 nations 
are signatories to the Outer Space Treaty.12 
The Outer Space Treaty’s primary restrictions on extraterrestrial 
military activity come from Article IV.13 First, it prohibits any sig-
natory nations from “plac[ing] in orbit around the earth any objects 
carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction.”14 It similarly prohibits nations from “instal[ling] such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or station[ing] such weapons in outer 
space in any other manner.”15 Article IV then forbids “establishment 
of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing . . . of 
weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bod-
ies.”16 Article IV does, however, allow the participation of military 
personnel in scientific research for “peaceful purposes” and “peace-
ful exploration” of celestial bodies.17 Nowhere does the Outer Space 
Treaty define what it intends to mean by peaceful purposes or peace-
ful exploration.18 Article IV’s restrictions are short but impactful. 
 
 9 Loren Grush, How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became 
the Backbone for Space Law, VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:14 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-space-treaty-50-anniver-
sary-exploration-guidelines. 
 10 Compare The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered 
into force June 23, 1961), with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3; see also Ramey, 
supra note 5, at 106–08. 
 11 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3. 
 12 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-
ties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280128cbd (last visited Dec. 
27, 2019) [hereinafter UN Information Page on the Outer Space Treaty]. 
 13 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See generally id.; see also Ramey, supra note 5, at 78–79. 
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Many legal and military commentators have reflected on the re-
strictions the Article places on military actions in space.19 Specific 
impacts will be discussed in Part II, infra, but suffice it to say simply 
that both military action and emplacements in orbit and beyond 
Earth are severely limited by the Outer Space Treaty.20 
These restrictions are also significant in what they do not pre-
vent: the placement or utilization of military forces or bases in deep 
space or in orbit around other celestial bodies.21 Other commenta-
tors, however, have suggested that such activities are “implicitly 
prohibited” by other provisions of the Outer Space Treaty as well as 
separate provisions of the United Nations Charter that regulate use 
of force by nations.22 Curiously, such an analysis misses the fact that 
prohibitions on use of force would not prevent the stationing of mil-
itary forces or facilities in deep space or in orbit around other planets 
or celestial bodies. However, such activities surely remain far in the 
future and will be discussed minimally in this Note. 
Articles IX through XII place different restrictions on military 
activities in space: instead of explicitly prohibiting certain conduct, 
they require affirmative disclosures of certain activities by the con-
ducting nations.23 Article IX requires that states seek “consulta-
tions” with other parties to the Outer Space Treaty before conduct-
ing activities that could “cause potentially harmful interference with 
activities of other [parties].”24 Article IX also allows nations party 
to the treaty to request such consultations from other parties based 
 
 19 E.g., Esparza, supra note 5, at 341–42; Blair Stevenson Kuplic, The 
Weaponization of Outer Space: Preventing an Extraterrestrial Arms Race, 39 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1123, 1144–47 (2014); Christopher M. Petras, 
“Space Force Alpha”: Military Use of the International Space Station and the 
Concept of “Peaceful Purposes”, 53 AIR FORCE L. REV. 135, 157–61 (2002); 
Ramey, supra note 5, at 78–85; Arjen Vermeer, A Legal Exploration of Force 
Application in Outer Space, 46 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 299, 307–13 (2007); Rex 
J. Zedalis & Catherine L. Wade, Note, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer 
Space Treaty of 1967, 8 CAL. WESTERN INT’L L.J. 454, 459–61 (1978). Generally, 
these reviews agree on the legality of most military activity in space under the 
treaty, although some distinctions will be discussed in Part II, infra. 
 20 E.g., Esparza, supra note 5, at 341–42. 
 21 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV. 
 22 Ramey, supra note 5, at 82. 
 23 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, arts. IX–XII. 
 24 Id. art. IX. 
2020] THE FUTURE IS TODAY 569 
 
on the “reason to believe” the other parties’ actions could create in-
terference.25 Article X requires nations to “consider . . . any re-
quests” made by other treaty parties to view the launch of any ob-
jects into space (although it does not actually require states to allow 
the suggested observation).26 Article XI requires parties to inform 
the United Nations (“UN”) and the public about any “activities in 
outer space . . . to the greatest extent feasible and practicable.”27 Ar-
ticle XI even goes so far as to require the disclosure of “the nature, 
conduct, locations and results of such activities.”28 Finally, Article 
XII requires that any “stations, installations, equipment and space 
vehicles . . . shall be open to representatives of other States Parties 
to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.”29 
These affirmative requirements do not outright restrict any al-
lowable military activities, but they do require disclosures of per-
sonnel, materiel, installations, and actions to a degree that is incom-
patible with general military operations security.30 Military opera-
tions require some level of secrecy to function effectively.31 Once 
an opponent knows what a military force is doing, where its person-
nel and weapons are emplaced, and what methods of attack and de-
fense are available to it, that opponent can prepare for and avoid 
much of that military force’s capabilities.32 For this reason, the dis-
closures required by Articles IX through XII effectively hamstring 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. art. X. 
 27 Id. art. XI. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. art. XII. 
 30 See DEP’T OF DEF., UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF. FOR INTELLIGENCE, NO. 
5205.02-M, DOD OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) MANUAL APP. 12 (2008), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Por-
tals/54/Docments/DD/issuances/dodm/520502m.pdf [hereinafter OPSEC 
MANUAL] (“The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, 
and protect critical information . . . Such information, if revealed to an adversary, 
may prevent or degrade mission accomplishment, cause loss of life, or damage 
friendly resources.”). 
 31 Id. 
 32 See id. 
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any military operations in space by requiring a military force to vi-
olate the fundamental tenets of operational security.33 Therefore, Ar-
ticle IV is not the only component of the Outer Space Treaty with 
serious implications for the Space Force. 
B. The Law of Armed Conflict and Other Restrictions 
The body of international law that makes up the Law of Armed 
Conflict must be considered regarding military operations in 
space.34 So, too, must other treaties on the conduct of nations in 
space.35 Some of these treaties are duplicative of the Outer Space 
Treaty, or expansive on topics touched upon in the Outer Space 
Treaty, while a few others are largely separate.36 As elaborated be-
low, each will impact operations of the Space Force, but none will 
impose restrictions of a similar level as the Outer Space Treaty. 
1. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
The Law of Armed Conflict is a distinct body of international 
law drawn from many international agreements and treaties.37 Func-
tionally, it may be treated as two distinct concepts, although both are 
considered to be components of LOAC: jus in bello; or, international 
law regulating conduct of armed forces during the course of a war, 
and jus ad bellum; or, international law defining the legality of ini-
tiating war.38 Regardless of the distinction, neither concept makes 
an exception for military action based on the action’s location or 
point of origination.39 
There is no good reason to assume, then, that LOAC would not 
apply to the use of weapons based in space or military actions that 
occur in space.40 LOAC’s importance to an independent Space 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Esparza, supra note 5, at 342; see also Ramey, supra note 5, at 28–63 (dis-
cussing the development of the Law of Armed Conflict as a distinct body of in-
ternational law and evaluating restrictions placed on military forces). 
 35 Ramey, supra note 5, at 64–66. 
 36 See id. at 86, 89, 91, 96 (discussing the Rescue and Return Agreement, 
Liability Convention, Registration Convention, and Moon Agreement as expan-
sions of the Outer Space Treaty). 
 37 See id. at 28–63. 
 38 Id. at 32–34. 
 39 Esparza, supra note 5, at 342–43. 
 40 Id. at 343. 
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Force is then both serious and not: as a branch of the armed forces, 
any action conducted by the Space Force must comply with 
LOAC.41 Any military capabilities added to the Space Force from 
other branches would already have been compliant with LOAC, and 
any new capabilities added would similarly have to comply when 
utilized by the new branch.42 Given the emphasis the United States 
already places on compliance with LOAC,43 such requirements will 
not have any impacts on the development of a new force that are not 
already placed upon military action. 
2. BROADER TREATY FRAMEWORK 
Several other international agreements involving space either 
duplicate or expand upon key terms of the Outer Space Treaty.44 
This additional international framework includes the Treaty Ban-
ning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and 
Under Water (“Limited Test Ban Treaty”);45 the Rescue and Return 
Agreement;46 the Convention on the International Liability for Dam-
age Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (“Liability Convention”);47 
the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space of 1975 (“Registration Convention”);48 and the Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial 
Bodies of 1979 (“Moon Agreement”).49 One other previously im-
portant treaty, the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL: JUNE 2015 ii (2016), https://ar-
chive.defense.gov/pubs/law-of-war-manual-june-2015.pdf (“The law of war is of 
fundamental importance to the Armed Forces of the United States.”). 
 44 Ramey, supra note 5, at 73. 
 45 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter 
Limited Test Ban Treaty]. 
 46 Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 8. 
 47 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Con-
vention]. 
 48 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 
14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]. 
 49 G.A. Res. 34/68, Agreement on the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (Dec. 5, 1979) [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. 
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Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972 (“ABM Treaty”),50 was rendered 
void by the United States’ withdrawal in 2002.51 
i. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 
The Limited Test Ban Treaty predates the Outer Space Treaty,52 
the United States and Soviet Union having signed the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty in 1963.53 The Limited Test Ban Treaty, like the Outer 
Space Treaty, bans the use of nuclear weapons in space, although it 
is more explicit regarding use and does not prevent signatory nations 
from placing nuclear weapons in orbit.54 This creates a very similar 
restriction on military employment of nuclear weapons in a space-
based conflict but does not restrict the use of nuclear weapons 
dropped from orbit, unlike the Outer Space Treaty.55 Interestingly, 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty may prevent the use of nuclear-fission-
powered space vehicles, as the Treaty bans any nuclear explosion in 
space.56 More practically, the Limited Test Ban Treaty also disal-
lows the use of nuclear weapons detonated in orbit to create an elec-
tromagnetic pulse effect, a tactic that could effectively disable en-
emy satellites.57 
ii. The Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968 
The Rescue and Return Agreement expands upon the Outer 
Space Treaty’s requirement in Articles V and XIII that signatory na-
tions will attempt to rescue and assist astronauts of other nations in 
 
 50 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 
944 U.N.T.S. 13448 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]. 
 51 Fact Sheet: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, CTR. FOR ARMS CONTROL & 
NON-PROLIFERATION (May 12, 2017), https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-
anti-ballistic-missile-treaty/; see also ABM Treaty Fact Sheet: Announcement of 
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 13, 2001), 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-
2.html. 
 52 Compare Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 45, with Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 3. 
 53 Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 45. 
 54 Id. art. I. 
 55 Compare id., with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV. 
 56 Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 45, art. I; see also Ramey, supra note 
5, at 101. 
 57 Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 45, art. I; see also Ramey, supra note 
5, at 101. 
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distress and return those astronauts to their home nation.58 The Res-
cue and Return Agreement requires that nations assist any foreign 
astronauts “experiencing conditions of distress”59 and “safely and 
promptly return[ ]” any personnel that land on a signatory nation’s 
soil or are found by that signatory nation.60 At first glance, this 
agreement seems to require an immediate return of any astronauts 
captured as prisoners of war (“POWs”) should hostilities commence 
in space. This may not be true, at least so long as the Outer Space 
Treaty is in force—presuming the POWs are captured from the side 
violating the Outer Space Treaty’s peaceful purposes clause by ini-
tiating hostilities.61 However, the Rescue and Return Agreement’s 
requirement to return recovered astronauts “promptly”62 would bear 
larger consideration if the United States were to withdraw from the 
Outer Space Treaty and, in the future, military personnel conduct 
physical operations beyond the bounds of Earth. 
iii. The Liability Convention of 1972 
The Liability Convention similarly expands upon an article of 
the Outer Space Treaty, this time Article VII’s establishment of na-
tions’ liability for damages caused by their “space objects.”63 The 
Convention establishes a multi-tiered system of determining liabil-
ity for damages.64 Interestingly, the Convention does not draw a dis-
tinction between military or civilian space objects or activities.65 
Quite probably, then, the Liability Convention could subject a state 
to pecuniary liability for military operations conducted from 
space,66 although the likelihood of this affecting a decision to use 
military force, when necessary, seems unlikely, as a successful bel-
ligerent would be able to impose its conditions for peace, and un-
successful belligerents tend to owe reparations in some form post-
 
 58 Compare Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 8, art. II, with Outer 
Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. V, XIII. 
 59 Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 8, art. I. 
 60 Id. art. IV. 
 61 See Ramey, supra note 5, at 153. 
 62 Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 8, art. IV. 
 63 Compare Liability Convention, supra note 47, art. II, with Outer Space 
Treaty, supra note 3, art. VII. 
 64 Liability Convention, supra note 47, arts. XIV–XVI. 
 65 See generally id.; see also Ramey, supra note 5, at 90. 
 66 Ramey, supra note 5, at 90. 
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conflict.67 While international liability for space-based military ac-
tivities would remain, then, after a withdrawal from the Outer Space 
Treaty, the Liability Convention’s provisions seem unlikely to have 
a significant impact on the Space Force. 
iv. The Registration Convention of 1975 
The Registration Convention establishes a system to record 
basic functional and orbital information about each satellite placed 
into Earth’s orbit.68 The Convention opens with a statement of dual 
purpose: concerns of both national liability for space objects and the 
peaceful use of space.69 The registration system itself, however, is 
limited to very basic information about the satellite, requiring the 
nation to identify its ownership as well as the launch location, orbital 
information, and “general function of the space object.”70 The Con-
vention does not define or give an example of a description of a sat-
ellite’s general function;71 this determination is instead left to the 
state providing the information.72 The Registration Convention’s 
impact on military operational security may not be as serious or det-
rimental as the Outer Space Treaty’s under Article XII, then, as the 
United States could describe military satellites’ general functions 
vaguely enough to prevent easy identification via the international 
registry.73 Indeed, despite the registry’s existence, the use of satel-
lites for military reconnaissance has hardly been hamstrung.74 
 
 67 See Reparations, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/topic/reparations (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (defining “reparations” as 
“a levy on a defeated country forcing it to pay some of the war costs of the winning 
countries”). 
 68 Registration Convention, supra note 48, art. II. 
 69 Id. pmbl. 
 70 Id. art. IV. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Ramey, supra note 5, at 93. States have an affirmative duty to provide only 
the following information to the international registry: name of launching state, a 
designator or registration number for the space object, date and location of launch, 
basic orbital information (nodal period, inclination, apogee, and perigee), and the 
general function of the space object. Registration Convention, supra note 48, art. 
IV. 
 73 Ramey, supra note 5, at 93. 
 74 Id. at 94. 
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v. The Moon Agreement of 1979 
Despite its name, the Moon Agreement extends its wording to 
celestial bodies generally, much like the Outer Space Treaty.75 Like 
the other agreements and conventions discussed above, the Moon 
Agreement expands upon restrictions and requirements established 
in the Outer Space Treaty; however, unlike the other treaties, the 
United States is not currently a signatory nation.76 It allows the same 
use of military forces on celestial bodies as the Outer Space 
Treaty—peaceful purposes including scientific research—but elab-
orates on more distinct restrictions on the use of military capabilities 
in space.77 The Agreement prohibits outright any “threat or use of 
force or any other hostile act on the moon.”78 It also prohibits signa-
tories from placing weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) in orbit 
around any celestial bodies.79 Significantly, the agreement does not 
prohibit the emplacement of other weapons around celestial bod-
ies.80 Given that the Agreement essentially parrots the Outer Space 
Treaty’s restrictions on military activities on celestial bodies, and 
does little other than add additional wording to the Outer Space 
Treaty’s requirement that any military activities be only for peaceful 
purposes, the Moon Agreement does not add significantly to the 
framework of international restrictions on Space Force capabili-
ties.81 The Moon Agreement could have one potential complication 
for future actions of the Space Force, which this Note will address 
later in Parts III and IV. Should efforts materialize to colonize plan-
etary bodies, the Moon Agreement presents the same host of issues 
 
 75 Compare Moon Agreement, supra note 49, art. I, with Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 3, art. I. 
 76 Compare Moon Agreement, supra note 49, with Outer Space Treaty, supra 
note 3; DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 
2019 546–47 (2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019-
TIF-Bilaterals-web-version.pdf (listing treaties and other international agree-
ments the United States has signed regarding space, without presence of the Moon 
Agreement); see also Ramey, supra note 5, at 98. 
 77 Compare Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV, with Moon Agreement, 
supra note 49, art. II. 
 78 Moon Agreement, supra note 49, art. III. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See generally id. 
 81 See Ramey, supra note 5, at 96. 
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for military enforcement of any laws, national or international, gov-
erning that colonization effort, and the United States should there-
fore avoid signing the Moon Agreement. 
II. MODERN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND SPACE 
This Part will address specific military capabilities that could 
become a part of the Space Force and will evaluate their individual 
legality under the Outer Space Treaty. First, it will focus on WMD 
and whether orbital strike capabilities would fall within the Outer 
Space Treaty’s restrictions on such capabilities. Second, it will eval-
uate the possibility of placing anti-ballistic missile defenses in orbit. 
Third, it will analyze anti-satellite weaponry under the Outer Space 
Treaty. Finally, it will discuss the Outer Space Treaty’s potential 
impacts on human exploration and colonization of space. 
A. Orbital Strike Capabilities 
Current military technology can easily allow for the placement 
of weapons on satellites in high- or low-earth orbit.82 The more dif-
ficult question is whether the placement and use of such weapons 
would violate the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition on satellites car-
rying WMD.83 Varying types of weapons will produce varying ef-
fects, and such effects must be considered in determining whether 
or not a weapon is defined as a WMD.84 Some more futuristic tech-
nologies, such as directed energy weapons (“DEWs”) (colloquially 
although inaccurately called lasers), could potentially raise concerns 
regarding Article IV’s prohibitions on WMD, as well.85 
 
 82 David C. Hardesty, Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implica-
tions and Alternatives, 58 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 45, 52 (2005). 
 83 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV; see also Hardesty, supra note 
82, at 53 (discussing the Outer Space Treaty and stating, “it is difficult to distin-
guish space-based WMD from space-based non-WMD.”). 
 84 See Vermeer, supra note 19, at 308–10. 
 85 Id. Vermeer determines that DEWs should not be considered WMD under 
any traditional definition, even though some types employ atomic energy to func-
tion. Id. at 309–10. The question remains open and barely explored. 
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1. DEFINING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
Although the UN has not established a single, overarching defi-
nition of WMD, and the Outer Space Treaty itself does not define 
the term, different bodies of the UN have established the term to be 
as broad as “all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”86 or 
“atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal 
chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the 
future which have characteristics comparable in destructive ef-
fect.”87 These definitions leave undefined the full meaning of 
“adaptable” or “comparable.” Arguments abound over exactly what 
weapons satisfy international definitions.88 The United States takes 
an even broader view of WMD, as the United States Code defines 
the term to mean “any destructive device.”89 The term destructive 
device is defined in a different section of the Code as “any explo-
sive, incendiary, or poison gas.”90 Such a definition is substantially 
broader than the UN definitions. The United States Code’s defini-
tion is likely not relevant to interpreting the Outer Space Treaty, as 
it is directed at domestic prevention of terrorism,91 but it illustrates 
just how generally the term can be interpreted. The ambiguity inher-
ent in the definition of WMD leaves some uncertainty around em-
ploying weapons in space.92 
2. ORBITAL STRIKE WEAPONS 
Given the extensive nuclear capabilities of the United States mil-
itary,93 basing nuclear weapons in orbit would not be worth the as-
sociated costs. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that 
 
 86 G.A. Res. 1(I), ¶ 5(c) (Jan. 24, 1946). 
 87 G.A. Res. 34/87 A (Dec. 11, 1979). 
 88 See, e.g., Hardesty, supra note 82, at 53; Vermeer, supra note 19, at 308–
10. 
 89 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2)(a) (2018). 
 90 Id. § 921(a)(4)(a). 
 91 See id. 
 92 See, e.g., Hardesty, supra note 82, at 53; Vermeer, supra note 19, at 308–
10. 
 93 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capability, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessment-us-military-power/us-nu-
clear-weapons-capability; Kingston Reif, U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs, 
ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Aug. 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/US-
NuclearModernization. 
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simply modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal will cost 1.2 trillion 
dollars.94 Given the cost of updating the current nuclear arsenal, bas-
ing nuclear weapons in space—the most obvious way to violate the 
Outer Space Treaty—would not be worth whatever it would cost. 
What space does offer, however, is the ability to conduct world-
wide strikes of a more limited capability without the need to send 
aircraft carriers around the world or establish forward air bases 
abroad.95 Hypervelocity Rod Bundles, also known as “eroding rods” 
or more colloquially as “Rods from God,” could strike targets across 
the globe with a response time of one-and-a-half to two hours.96 
These munitions, typically suggested to be a simple tungsten rod re-
leased from a satellite in high-earth orbit,97 could offer an explosive 
yield comparable to their weight capable of destroying hardened tar-
gets like underground bunkers, missile silos, or reinforced aircraft 
bunkers.98 Whether basing hypervelocity rods on satellites is lawful 
under the Outer Space Treaty, however, is as unsettled as the defi-
nition of WMD.99 As the rods do not provide a nuclear, chemical, or 
biological yield, they may not be considered traditional WMD;100 
however, their immense destructive power could potentially run 
afoul of broad UN definitions.101 Therefore, the Space Force’s abil-
ity to provide new strike capabilities with hypervelocity rods re-
mains legally uncertain under the Outer Space Treaty. 
Finally, and with the least legal controversy, the Space Force 
could station and maintain conventional weapons on satellites in 
low-earth orbit.102 Stationing conventional munitions similar to the 
smart bombs carried by modern fighter aircraft in low-earth orbit 
 
 94 MICHAEL BENNETT, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, APPROACHES FOR MANAGING 
THE COSTS OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES, 2017 TO 2046, at 3 (2017), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/presenta-
tion/53334-presentation.pdf. 
 95 See Hardesty, supra note 82, at 51–53. 
 96 Id. at 51–52; Colin Johnston, Rods from God: A Terrifying Space 
Weapon?, ARMAGH OBSERVATORY & PLANETARIUM (Sep. 27, 2010), 
http://www.armaghplanet.com/rods-from-god-a-terrifying-space-weapon.html. 
 97 Johnston, supra note 97. 
 98 Hardesty, supra note 82, at 51–53. 
 99 See id. at 53. 
 100 See Vermeer, supra note 19, at 308–10 (discussing the legality of nuclear 
weapons that lack the traditional characteristics of weapons termed WMD). 
 101 Id. at 308–09. 
 102 Hardesty, supra note 82, at 52. 
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would allow even more rapid employment than hypervelocity rods, 
with a likely response time of twenty to thirty minutes.103 Because 
placement of non-WMD in space does not explicitly violate the 
Outer Space Treaty,104 this option would allow the Space Force to 
easily provide a new strike option that the United States military 
currently lacks, although more limited in capability than hyper-
velocity rods. 
B. Anti-Ballistic Missile Defenses 
The idea of basing anti-ballistic missile (“ABM”) weapons on 
satellites to defend against nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (“ICBMs”) first emerged in 1983, when President Reagan 
proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (“SDI”).105 While the SDI 
was nothing but an idea in the 1980s, derided by some opponents as 
“Star Wars” for its suggestion of using lasers to shoot down Soviet 
ICBMs,106 some of the concepts that once seemed like science fic-
tion have inched closer to reality today. For example, the Air Force 
suggested development of one such weapon, a functional ABM sys-
tem called the Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engage-
ment, or EAGLE, in a 2003 plan.107 One great concern of the plan, 
which would use space-based mirrors to reflect a powerful ground-
based laser beam at incoming missiles, was that adversaries would 
be able to track the mirror satellites and either shoot them down or 
launch ICBMs in the windows where the mirrors provided the least 
coverage of launch points.108 The Outer Space Treaty does not ban 
such satellites or require their outright disclosure, but the Registra-
 
 103 Id. 
 104 Kuplic, supra note 19, at 1148. 
 105 Strategic Defense Initiative, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Strategic-Defense-Initiative (last visited Oct. 
28, 2019). 
 106 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (Jul. 18, 
2018), https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/strategic-defense-initiative-sdi. 
 107 Hardesty, supra note 82, at 46, 49–50. EAGLE’s legality (or the legality 
of a similar modern system) vis-à-vis the Outer Space Treaty should not be a con-
cern, as the beam emitter would be physically located on Earth. Of course, if a 
plan called for stationing such an emitter on a satellite in orbit, concerns about the 
weapon’s definition would again be pertinent. 
 108 Id. 
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tion Convention does require the United States to identify such sat-
ellites’ basic purpose,109 leading to the concern that adversaries 
could easily identify and defeat them. Regardless of the specific type 
of ABM system developed, such systems are legal, if of limited 
value under the Outer Space Treaty and other international agree-
ments. 
C. Anti-Satellite Warfare 
Unlike the futuristic idea of mounting orbital strike weapons or 
anti-ballistic missile defense on satellites, anti-satellite (“ASAT”) 
warfare exists in the here and now.110 The United States first demon-
strated the ability to hit a satellite with an air-launched missile in 
1985.111 After a long pause in ASAT weapons testing, China demon-
strated its own ability to hit satellites when it struck one of its aging 
weather satellites with a ground-launched ballistic missile in 
2007.112 The United States responded to the Chinese test in 2008 by 
downing one of its own aging satellites with a ship-based missile.113 
India struck one of its own aging military satellites with a ground-
launched missile, becoming only the fourth nation to test an ASAT 
weapon in 2019.114 The Russian military is believed to be pursuing 
a modern ASAT weapon system, as well.115  
 
 109 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV; Registration Convention, supra 
note 48, art. I. 
 110 LAURA GREGO, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, A HISTORY OF ANTI-
SATELLITE PROGRAMS 1 (2012), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-
09/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf. 
 111 Id. at 5. 
 112 Id. at 13.  
 113 See id. at 12–13. India later joined the exclusive group of the United States, 
Russia, and China in having tested functional ASAT missiles.   
 114 Ashlyn Still et al., India Shoots Down Own Satellite, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 
2019) https://graphics.reuters.com/INDIA-SATELLITE-
WEAPON/0100918Q1RV/index.html. 
 115 Leonard David, China, Russia Advancing Anti-Satellite Technology, US 
Intelligence Chief Says, SPACE.COM (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.space.com/36891-space-war-anti-satellite-weapon-develop-
ment.html.  
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The legality of ASAT weapons under the Outer Space Treaty is, 
however, up for significant debate.116 This debate extends to the in-
ternational arena, as Japan has condemned the Chinese ASAT test 
in 2007 as illegal, while other countries merely condemned the Chi-
nese action as irresponsible.117 Furthermore, the plain wording of 
the Outer Space Treaty strongly suggests that ASATs are, if not pro-
hibited, at least restricted in use under Article IX’s reporting require-
ments.118 These restrictions remain in place regardless of the method 
used: even if nations resorted to non-kinetic ASAT weapons, such 
as electronic jamming, the Outer Space Treaty’s implications re-
main.119 
What may be currently allowed, however, are defensive ASATs: 
the Outer Space Treaty focuses its prohibitions on activities inter-
fering with “peaceful exploration and use.”120 Indeed, it seems to be 
that nations do not forego the right to self-defense in space because 
of the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibitions.121 Therefore, the Space 
Force could, without implicating the Outer Space Treaty, employ 
 
 116 Compare Zedalis, supra note 19, at 481–82 (determining ASAT weapons 
to be illegal under the Outer Space Treaty, while calling for further international 
agreements clarifying the illegality of ASAT weapons), and Kuplic, supra note 
19, at 1152–53 (confirming that international norms are trending towards nations 
viewing ASAT weapons as illegal), with Esparza, supra note 5, at 355 (determin-
ing that kinetic ASAT weapons do not violate the Outer Space Treaty because 
they are not specifically prohibited). While the debate about ASAT legality re-
mains open, it appears to be weighted towards the view that ASATs are illegal 
under the Outer Space Treaty. 
 117 Kuplic, supra note 19, at 1149–51. 
 118 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX. 
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activ-
ity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause po-
tentially harmful interference with activities of other States Par-
ties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appro-
priate international consultations before proceeding with any 
such activity or experiment. 
Id. At a bare minimum, Article IX seems to require that states disclose the use of 
an ASAT to any potentially affected nation prior to use of the weapon. Prior dis-
closure would prevent the effective viability of ASATs as a military tactic. 
 119 Esparza, supra note 5, at 351. 
 120 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX. 
 121 See, e.g., Esparza, supra note 5, at 356; Ramey, supra note 5, at 62–63. 
582 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:563 
 
space-based defensive weapons meant to protect American satellites 
from ASATs.122 
D. General Military Activities 
Until recently, the idea of establishing extraterrestrial colonies 
seemed like science fiction, better suited to a Heinlein novel or a 
blockbuster movie than a reality the international community would 
need to address. While such an effort must still be some time in the 
future, today some entrepreneurs tout plans to establish colonies on 
Mars and make spaceflight commercially accessible.123 Even if talk 
of extraterrestrial colonies is still uncommon, others see increasing 
commercial opportunities beyond Earth.124 While the practical im-
plications of such developments cannot be truly known before hu-
manity reaches out into the heavens, the Outer Space Treaty has al-
ready established restrictions that could hamper such development: 
primarily, the ban on military activities and installations on celestial 
bodies.125 These possibilities remain far in the future, so new inter-
national agreements could rise to handle the problems space coloni-
zation could present. Currently, no nation could legally protect its 
citizens on such colonies or handle any disputes that could arise be-
cause the Outer Space Treaty places a complete bar on the use of 
military forces for any activities other than peaceful exploration or 
scientific research.126 
While faith in international agreements may lead to the belief 
that military forces will not be needed beyond Earth, U.S. military 
 
 122 Because many proposed ASATs are in fact themselves satellites, these de-
fensive weapons would also be considered ASATs. Esparza, supra note 5, at 349–
55. However, as Ramey notes, signatory nations are likely unable to avail them-
selves of the Outer Space Treaty’s protections once their space-based activities 
imperil the safety of another nation’s legal satellites, and so therefore purely de-
fensive ASATs should not violate the Outer Space Treaty, even when employed 
to interfere with an aggressor ASAT. See Ramey, supra note 5, at 136. 
 123 See, e.g., Elon Musk, Making Humans a Multi-Planetary Species, 5 NEW 
SPACE 46, 46 (2017); Making Life Interplanetary, SPACEX, 
https://www.spacex.com/mars (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter SpaceX 
Mars Plan]. 
 124 See, e.g., Our Mission, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/our-
mission (last visited Dec. 29, 2019). 
 125 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV. 
 126 Id. 
2020] THE FUTURE IS TODAY 583 
 
power has defined the period of relative peace and prosperity after 
the Second World War, often referred to as the “Pax Americana.”127 
This period of peace has been indisputably protected by American 
military power.128 Should space colonization become a reality, some 
power will need to fill the void created by new expansions. Whether 
that power will be American, international, or another nation, the 
Outer Space Treaty as it stands forbids the use of military personnel 
to enforce peace beyond the Earth.129 Therefore, should such a duty 
ever become a mission of the Space Force in the future, as far off as 
it may be, the Outer Space Treaty will need to be discarded or re-
worked to avoid treaty violations. 
III. THE SPACE FORCE 
This Part will address the necessity of making the Space Force a 
capable and functional military branch in its own right, rather than 
an amalgamation of prior-existing agencies and units. First, it will 
address the Pentagon’s current proposed plan, evaluating what por-
tions could create potential conflicts with existing space law. Sec-
ond, it will offer the potential national security solutions an unshack-
led Space Force could offer the United States. 
A. Structure of the New Branch 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
(“NDAA”) establishes the Space Force as a component branch of 
the Air Force.130 The NDAA authorized a Chief of Space Opera-
tions, a general officer who will report to the Secretary of the Air 
Force and serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.131 The Space Force will 
initially be composed of servicemembers drawn entirely from the 
 
 127 Pax Americana, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/Pax%20Americana (last visited Dec. 29, 2019). 
 128 Christopher Layne, The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Be-
came Inevitable, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/interna-
tional/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-
inevitable/256388/. 
 129 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IV. 
 130 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-
92, §§ 951–61 (2019) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 908). 
 131 Id. §§ 952(b)(1), 953 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 9081(b)(1), 9082). 
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active duty Air Force; the NDAA authorized no new military posi-
tions for the Space Force.132 The current Secretary of the Air Force, 
Barbara Barret, plans to assign roughly 16,000 military servicemem-
bers and civilian employees employed by Air Force Space Com-
mand to the new Space Force.133  
The NDAA also establishes the Space Force’s official functions 
and duties.134 The Space Force’s purpose is to provide “freedom of 
operation for the United States in, from, and to space” and “prompt 
and sustained space operations.”135 The Space Force is responsible 
for (1) “protect[ing] the interests of the United States in space,” (2) 
“deter[ring] aggression in, from, and to space,” and (3) “con-
duct[ing] space operations.”136 
While the current plan for the Space Force provides no explicit 
indication that the service would be pursuing new capabilities, its 
voice on the Joint Chiefs of Staff should allow for visionary officers 
to advocate for the new capabilities the Space Force can provide the 
United States.137 The new service’s duties to provide freedom of op-
 
 132 Id. § 952(d)(2) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 9081(d)(2)). 
 133 Rachel S. Cohen, Space Force Established as Trump Signs NDAA, AIR 
FORCE MAGAZINE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.airforcemag.com/space-force-
established-as-trump-signs-ndaa/.  
 134 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 §§ 952(c), (d) (to 
be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 9081(c), (d)). 
 135 Id. § 952(c) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 9081(c)). 
 136 Id. § 952(d) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 9081(d)). 
 137 The Army officers who formed the Army Air Corps, later the Army Air 
Service, Army Air Forces, and finally the independent Air Force advocated for 
the radical changes in military structure and doctrine as air power evolved in the 
early twentieth century. Army Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell, fa-
mously court-martialed for his zealous advocacy of airpower and an independent 
Air Force, is often remembered as the most outspoken supporter of the radical 
changes airpower wrought on twentieth-century combat. See Minnie L. Jones, 
William “Billy” Mitchell – ‘The Father of the United States Air Force,’ U.S. 
ARMY (Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.army.mil/article/33680/william_billy_mitch-
ell_the_father_of_the_united_states_air_force. However, he was far from the 
only military officer to do so. General of the Air Force Henry “Hap” Arnold, a 
contemporary of General Mitchell’s known for his steadier hand in the develop-
ment of the Air Force, played a more important, if less public, role in developing 
airpower as an American military capability. See General Henry H. Arnold, U.S. 
AIR FORCE, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Arti-
cle/107811/general-henry-h-arnold/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). Given the military 
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erations and deter enemy aggression in space suggest that the ser-
vice’s needs for new capabilities will grow as human use of space 
becomes more common. Given that many of the capabilities future 
Space Force officers could advocate for are banned, restricted, or 
hampered by the Outer Space Treaty, as discussed in Part II, supra, 
and elaborated upon in Section III.B, infra, the United States should 
reevaluate the current international legal framework regarding mili-
tary activities in space. 
 
B. Positive Impacts of Withdrawal 
Withdrawing from the Outer Space Treaty would allow the 
Space Force to pursue new strategic and tactical capabilities that 
could drastically enhance the new branch’s contributions to national 
security. The Space Force would immediately be able to pursue its 
capabilities in orbit with less interference and greater operational se-
curity.138 It could station defensive ASATs around critical commu-
nications and reconnaissance satellites without having to disclose 
exactly which satellites possessed defensive capabilities, thereby 
making an adversary commit more resources before striking at 
American satellites, or even preventing such potential attacks out-
right.139 Similarly, it could station ABM satellites in orbit without 
having to disclose the exact nature of American missile defenses.140 
Finally, it could emplace modern strike weaponry on satellites in 
low-earth orbit, granting reaction times around the globe that aircraft 
could never match, and again conceal the purpose of such satellites 
from adversaries.141 
With an eye to the future, the Space Force could develop more 
unique and intensive strike options, such as hypervelocity rods, or 
other technologies not yet conceived.142 It could develop an exten-
sive and capable ASAT program able to remove adversaries’ space 
 
capabilities space can offer, having an independent service head for the Space 
Force seems likely to generate support for new ideas along the lines seen in the 
Air Force’s own history. 
 138 See OPSEC MANUAL, supra note 30, at 12–14. 
 139 See supra Part II.C. 
 140 See supra Part II.B. 
 141 See supra Part II.A. 
 142 See supra Part II.A. 
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capabilities in the event of serious conflict, all while protecting its 
own satellites from interference.143 Furthest away, but bearing con-
sideration, the service could develop plans to protect extraterrestrial 
U.S. colonies or commercial interests as such ideas begin to edge 
towards reality.144 These capabilities would take the Space Force 
from being a mere recollection of sister-service units and turn it into 
a truly fearsome and meaningful military branch in its own right. In 
order to do so, the United States should consider withdrawal from 
the Outer Space Treaty, with all its potential implications and bene-
fits. 
C. The Necessity of Space-Based Military Capabilities 
The United States faces growing threats from multiple sources 
to its interests in space.145 While Russia has not continued to grow 
its military at its Cold-War level of development, it remains a capa-
ble threat to American satellites through kinetic and non-kinetic 
ASAT weaponry.146 Other nations, such as Iran and North Korea, 
have started pursuing space programs, albeit without truly signifi-
cant investments or developments.147 Of greatest concern to the 
United States, however, should be Chinese space-program develop-
ments.148 The Chinese continue to pursue advanced ASAT wea-
ponry, both kinetic, like the country’s 2007 missile test, and non-
kinetic (including electronic- and cyber-attack capabilities).149 Cru-
cially, the Chinese have highlighted the strategic importance of 
space in military publications and have created a military organiza-
tion dedicated to space and cyber warfare.150 
 
 143 See supra Part II.C. 
 144 See, e.g., SpaceX Mars Plan, supra note 122. 
 145 TODD HARRISON ET AL., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SPACE 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 2018, at 1 (2018), https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/04/Harrison_SpaceThreatAssessment_FULL_WEB.pdf. 
 146 Id. at 12–15. 
 147 Id. at 16–21. 
 148 See id. at 6. 
 149 Id. at 8–11. 
 150 Id. at 7. The Chinese military branch dedicated to space falls under the 
People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, and is called the Strategic Support Force, or 
SSF. Id. Full knowledge of the SSF’s capabilities, vice the rest of the PLA, is 
limited, but China is clearly making space a priority in its military development. 
Id. at 7–8. 
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IV. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 
This Part will address how the United States can, and whether 
the United States should, withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. 
First, it will address the legal mechanisms behind enforcement of 
international treaties and the Outer Space Treaty in particular. Sec-
ond, it will cover the methods by which the United States could le-
gally withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. Finally, it will con-
clude with the potential legal and geopolitical repercussions of 
American withdrawal, with a final emphasis on the possibility of an 
arms race in space. 
A. Treaty Enforcement 
Treaty enforcement as a cohesive idea in international law does 
not truly exist.151 In reality, enforcement of most treaties requires 
international attention and the imposition of sanctions on offending 
nations.152 Alternately, some treaties include dispute resolution or 
bilateral or multilateral enforcement mechanisms within their own 
framework.153 In the absence of practical enforcement imposed by 
treaties’ terms, states can take matters into their own hands, impos-
ing sanctions unilaterally or engaging in other methods of self-
help.154 
 
 151 Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Insti-
tutional Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1131, 1134–35 (2006). 
 152 Id. at 1135 (citing W. Michael Reisman, The Enforcement of International 
Judgments, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1969)). 
 153 Id. at 1136–38. One of the more regularly recognized examples of this ap-
proach can be seen in the World Trade Organization, which can expel members 
or impose trade sanctions for treaty violations. Id. 
 154 Id. at 1139–45. States can also enforce treaties on themselves under their 
own domestic law, although such concerns are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Whether or not the United States must automatically enforce ratified treaties as 
codified domestic law remains an ongoing legal debate. Compare John C. Yoo, 
Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-
Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2218–20 (1999) (elaborating on why Amer-
ican courts should not automatically enforce treaties as domestic law), with Martin 
S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and 
Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2096–2100 
(1999) (arguing treaties should be considered binding law on individuals within 
American courts). 
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The Outer Space Treaty itself contains no dispute resolution 
method or enforcement mechanism.155 The treaty does provide that 
signatories may “request consultation” with another party in certain 
circumstances, although there is no requirement that the other party 
agree to the request.156 In the event of another state’s violation of the 
Outer Space Treaty, the only real recompense signatories have 
would be the traditional methods of enforcement detailed above or, 
in the most extreme case, a state’s traditional right to self-defense.157 
None of this is to suggest the United States should violate the 
Outer Space Treaty; rather, it is to recognize that the United States 
(and any other signatory nation) has limited methods by which to 
protect itself via the Outer Space Treaty should another state violate 
its prohibitions or obligations.158 Indeed, given the treaty’s lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and the serious impacts warfare in space 
could have for American national security,159 the United States must 
be ready to fight in space.160 The only way this can be done is to 
actually prepare for the reality.161 Effective preparation requires two 
things: a military force focused on and capable of fighting beyond 
the lands, seas, or skies of Earth, which the Space Force can satisfy, 
if properly equipped; and withdrawal from the Outer Space Treaty. 
 
 155 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3; see also George D. Shrader, Defense in 
Outer Space, 49 MIL. L. REV. 157, 158 (1970). 
 156 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX. Not only does Article IX contain 
no requirement that the requested party agree to the consultation, the requesting 
party must actually have a “reason to believe” that the other party’s actions could 
be harmful in order to request the consultation. Id. Even then, the requested party 
is under no obligation to accept. See id. 
 157 See Shrader, supra note 155, at 159. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Kuplic, supra note 19, at 1140–42; Schmitt, supra note 4, at 125. 
 160 See Matt Rivers et al., China Lunar Rover Touches Down on Far Side of 
the Moon, State Media Announce, CNN (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/02/health/china-lunar-rover-far-moon-landing-
intl/index.html (last updated Jan. 4, 2019, 1:49 AM). The Chinese, notably, are 
pursuing an active space program and have demonstrated the ability to reach tar-
gets in orbit. Id. While the United States should not focus its growth on a single 
competitor, it must acknowledge the technological strides China has made in the 
past several decades and accept that it will not be the only space-capable power 
in the future. 
 161 Hardesty, supra note 82, at 65–66; Schmitt, supra note 4, at 125. 
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B. The Process of Withdrawal 
In the United States, treaty withdrawal requires an analysis of 
three elements: what type of agreement is at stake, whether interna-
tional or domestic law will govern the withdrawal, and whether 
Congress has enacted legislation to implement the agreement.162 
The type of agreement determines the international and domestic re-
quirements to achieve termination.163 Typically, in the case of treaty 
withdrawals, requirements of both international and domestic law 
must be considered in the United States.164 If Congress has enacted 
enforcement legislation for a particular treaty, then only Congress 
can repeal that legislation, regardless of whether the treaty behind 
the legislation is still in force.165 
Under international law, most treaties contain their own with-
drawal provisions.166 The Outer Space Treaty contains a withdrawal 
clause, which follows the international standard requiring a with-
drawing party to give notice to the “Depositary Governments” (here, 
the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom)167 one year prior 
to the party’s intended effective withdrawal date.168 There are no 
 
 162 STEPHAN P. MULLIGAN, WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE IRAN 
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 2 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44761.pdf. 
 163 Id. at 3. 
 164 See id. at 2–3. 
 165 Id. at 16–17; see All Information (Except Treaty Text) for Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/90th-congress/4/all-info (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2019) [hereinafter All Congressional Information on the Outer Space 
Treaty]. 
 166 MULLIGAN, supra note 162, at 4. If treaties do not contain their own with-
drawal requirements, then the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties will 
typically apply, which requires signatories to give twelve months’ notice to other 
parties prior to effective withdrawal from the treaty. See Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, arts. VII–XVII, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, although 
that will not matter for the Outer Space Treaty, which contains its own withdrawal 
requirements. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. XVI. 
 167 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2019) [hereinafter State Department Notes on the Outer Space Treaty]. 
 168 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. XVI. 
590 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:563 
 
other international legal repercussions for treaty withdrawal, alt-
hough states that disapprove of another’s withdrawal may be able to 
implement some international political or economic conse-
quences.169 
The domestic requirements for withdrawal from a Senate-ap-
proved treaty are more complicated and less settled than interna-
tional requirements.170 The generally accepted understanding seems 
to be that the President, as the head of the executive branch, has the 
authority to withdraw from treaties because the executive is solely 
responsible for “making official communications with foreign 
states.”171 However, this is not settled law, and there remains debate 
as to whether the Senate must also agree to treaty withdrawal.172 If 
Senate approval for withdrawal is required, then the same two-thirds 
majority that the Constitution establishes for ratification would also 
likely be necessary for the United States’ withdrawal.173   
However, scholars seem to generally argue that treaty with-
drawal is left entirely in the hands of the President.174 Executive 
branch officials have almost universally argued the same.175 Con-
gress as a whole has generally stepped back from involvement in 
treaty termination since the start of the twentieth century, though 
previously it had either authorized or retroactively approved presi-
dential withdrawal from treaties.176 The courts have rarely had rea-
 
 169 MULLIGAN, supra note 162, at 5. 
 170 Id. at 5–6. 
 171 Id. at 5. 
 172 Id. at 8–12; see also James J. Moriarty, Congressional Claims for Treaty 
Termination Powers in the Age of the Diminished Presidency, 14 CONN. J. INT’L 
L. 123, 127–28 (1999) (suggesting that Congress will begin to assert a more dom-
inant role in treaty termination as the Presidency shifts away from the Cold War’s 
focus on national security). 
 173 MULLIGAN, supra note 161, at 10; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
954 (1983) (holding that repeal of statutes must comply with Article I provisions 
just as passage of statutes must). If the Senate’s involvement in withdrawal is ever 
determined to be required, it is difficult to fathom a method where anything other 
than the two-thirds majority required for approval by the Constitution would sim-
ilarly be required for withdrawal. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 174 See, e.g., MULLIGAN, supra note 162, at 8–9. 
 175 Id. at 9 n.70 (citing executive memoranda advising that the President may 
unilaterally withdrawal from international treaties). 
 176 Id. at 10–12. 
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son to step into treaty-making decisions or processes, but the Su-
preme Court did address a challenge by Congressional members to 
an anticipated presidential treaty withdrawal in Goldwater v. 
Carter.177 Although the Court split and delivered a plurality opinion, 
the case was dismissed: the plurality found the issue to be a nonjus-
ticiable political question,178 with one concurring justice instead 
finding the issue at hand not ripe for review.179 Since Goldwater, 
courts have more actively moved to dismiss such disputes between 
the President and members of Congress as political questions.180 
Therefore, the President can likely choose to withdraw unilater-
ally from the Outer Space Treaty, much like President Bush unilat-
erally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.181 To satisfy 
international law, notice must be given to the governments of Russia 
and the United Kingdom one year prior to the United States’ effec-
tive withdrawal date.182 Because Congress has not enacted legisla-
tion enforcing the Outer Space Treaty’s restrictions on military ac-
tivity, no domestic concerns will prevent treaty withdrawal from al-
lowing the Space Force to move forward in pursuing new capabili-
ties.183 
C. Repercussions of Withdrawal 
While the United States need not be concerned about legal re-
percussions of withdrawing from the Outer Space Treaty, there are 
 
 177 444 U.S. 996, 997–98 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 178 Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“I am of the view that the basic 
question presented by the petitioners in this case is ‘political’ and therefore non-
justiciable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our 
country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is 
authorized to negate the action of the President.”). 
 179 Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Prudential considerations persuade me 
that a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review 
unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional author-
ity.”). 
 180 See, e.g., Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding 
a suit by Members of Congress opposing President Bush’s termination of the 
ABM Treaty to be a nonjusticiable political question and dismissing); see also 
MULLIGAN, supra note 162, at 14. 
 181 See Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 18. 
 182 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. XVI. 
 183 See All Congressional Information on the Outer Space Treaty, supra note 
165. 
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practical concerns that must be taken into account. Other nations 
could engage international organizations or simply act by them-
selves to place political pressure on the United States.184 Addition-
ally, other nations could increase military focus on space, potentially 
leading to a new arms race.185 
1. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONCERNS 
Two recent events surrounding high-profile arms-reduction trea-
ties illuminate the likely responses to a U.S. withdrawal from the 
Outer Space Treaty. The first is the United States’ unilateral with-
drawal from the ABM Treaty.186 The second is the U.S. withdrawal 
from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (“INF”) Treaty, officially an-
nounced by President Trump on February 1, 2019.187 Both examples 
suggest that withdrawal from the Outer Space Treaty could bring 
some international condemnation but little other action. 
In 2002, against the advice of commentators and pundits in the 
United States, President Bush withdrew from the ABM Treaty.188 
International reaction to the move could be described as mild, at 
worst: the Russians termed the American decision as “erroneous,” 
but also indicated the decision “does not pose a threat to the national 
security of the Russian Federation.”189 The Chinese stated opposi-
tion to an American ABM system but had no other reactions.190 
Arms control organizations noted that the international reaction was 
 
 184 MULLIGAN, supra note 162, at 5. 
 185 Kuplic, supra note 19, at 1156–58. 
 186 MULLIGAN, supra note 162, at 14. 
 187 President Donald J. Trump to Withdraw the United States from the Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEETS (Feb. 
1, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-
trump-withdraw-united-states-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/ 
[hereinafter President Trump to Withdraw US from INF Treaty]. 
 188 See Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, Unilateral Withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty Is a Bad Idea, BROOKINGS (Apr. 30, 2001), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/opinions/unilateral-withdrawal-from-the-abm-treaty-is-a-bad-idea/. 
 189 Terence Neilan, Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mis-
take, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 13, 2001), https://www.ny-
times.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls-out-of-abm-treaty-putin-calls-
move-a-mistake.html. 
 190 Id. The Chinese were not signatories to the ABM Treaty. See ABM Treaty, 
supra note 50. 
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“muted.”191 Domestically, President Bush’s move was met with 
some criticism,192 including an unsuccessful lawsuit filed by some 
members of Congress to prevent the treaty’s termination.193 Ulti-
mately, the United States saw very few repercussions and very little 
opposition to its move to terminate the treaty.194 
The INF Treaty, established in 1987 between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, banned “ground-launched” medium-range 
missiles.195 For years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
military had been accused by the United States and European na-
tions of openly violating the INF Treaty by building up intermedi-
ate-range ballistic missiles (“IRBMs”).196 Although Russian viola-
tions were acknowledged at the UN, international pressure on Rus-
sia to regain compliance with the INF Treaty repeatedly came to 
naught.197 In late 2017, following these repeated attempts to coax 
the Russians back to compliance, the United States indicated that it 
would consider withdrawing from the INF Treaty due to the Russian 
violations.198 In 2019, after some review, the United States followed 
through when President Trump announced the country’s pending 
withdrawal.199 
 
 191 E.g., Wade Boese, U.S. Withdraws from ABM Treaty; Global Response 
Muted, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, (July/Aug. 2002), https://www.armscon-
trol.org/act/2002-07/news/us-withdraws-abm-treaty-global-response-muted. 
 192 See id.; Daalder & Lindsay, supra note 190. 
 193 Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002). As discussed supra 
note 180, the suit failed on jurisdictional grounds. 
 194 Boese, supra note 191. 
 195 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles art. I, Dec. 8, 1987, 1657 U.N.T.S. 485 [hereinafter INF Treaty]; 
see also President Trump to Withdraw US from INF Treaty, supra note 187. In-
termediate-Range Ballistic Missiles, or IRBMs, were defined as having a range 
of 310 to 3,400 miles. INF Treaty, supra, art. II. The INF Treaty was initially 
established to remove Soviet and American short- and medium-range nuclear mis-
siles from Europe. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, The 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/inf (last visited Dec. 29, 2019). 
 196 Bureau of Arms Control, supra note 195; Steven Pifer, The Future of the 
INF Treaty, BROOKINGS (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/testimo-
nies/the-future-of-the-inf-treaty/. 
 197 Pifer, supra note 196. 
 198 Id. 
 199 President Trump to Withdraw US from INF Treaty, supra note 187. 
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International reaction to the INF Treaty withdrawal has been 
somewhat less muted, although still hardly strong.200 The Russians 
indicated that they would respond “accordingly.”201 European reac-
tion has been understandably stronger, as Russian IRBMs would be 
a threat to Europe, rather than to the United States.202 The North 
American Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the European Union 
(“EU”) restated their commitment to not employing IRBMs and in-
dicated that they both saw greater security with the agreement than 
without, although those comments made no mention of the fact that 
Russia had already been openly violating the treaty.203 Some Euro-
pean nations indicated an interest in beginning discussions about a 
new, more comprehensive arms control agreement to replace the ail-
ing—indeed, now dead—INF Treaty.204 Domestically, reactions ran 
much the same to withdrawal from the ABM Treaty: many political 
and national security figures opposed withdrawal, but reactions 
were not entirely one-sided, with some support for the President’s 
decision.205 
Withdrawal from the Outer Space Treaty would encompass sev-
eral differences from withdrawal from the ABM or INF Treaties. 
First, significantly more nations are party to the Outer Space 
Treaty.206 Second, the Outer Space Treaty covers more than just mil-
itary technological developments and arms control: it also covers 
 
 200 Shervin Taheran, Select Reactions to the INF Treaty Crisis, ARMS 
CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.armscon-
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 201 Id. The Russians likely wanted the United States to tear up the INF Treaty, 
as the Russian military had already been working to develop and implement weap-
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property rights issues and matters of exploration in space.207 Third, 
the United States cannot claim that another primary signatory is re-
peatedly and flagrantly violating the treaty’s terms as reason to with-
draw.208 
However, these reasons alone need not stop the United States 
from acting in its own, and indeed in its allies’, interests. Most of 
the countries that are signatories to the Outer Space Treaty are not 
physically capable of projecting force into space.209 While interna-
tional organizations and other signatories may make official state-
ments indicating disapproval with American withdrawal, such ac-
tions will not stand in the way of American objectives in withdraw-
ing.210 Indeed, international disapproval with such a move could 
also be a way to bring world leaders together to renegotiate an Outer 
Space Treaty that allows the United States to defend its satellites 
effectively, utilize space as necessary for military purposes, and ad-
dress future human expansion into space in a more adequate manner, 
all while maintaining restrictions on true WMD in space.211 
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SPACE-BASED ARMS RACE 
The single greatest concern of any move to increase military ac-
tivities and capabilities in space is the possibility of kick-starting a 
new arms race.212 The UN has adopted regular resolutions aimed at 
preventing a space-based arms race,213 although the United States 
has typically abstained from such resolutions.214 Some commenta-
tors have called for a reevaluation of the Outer Space Treaty, or even 
 
 207 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, arts. II, III, IX, XI. 
 208 Baev, supra note 201. 
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a new, stronger treaty restricting military activity in and the weapon-
ization of space.215 
However, this concern has already developed beyond restriction 
or prevention: current Chinese efforts are beginning to show that 
space will be a likely next frontier in combat.216 China’s recent land-
ing of an autonomous exploration vehicle on the dark side of the 
Moon has distinctly military applications,217 and, after China’s will-
ingness to continue development of ASAT weapons despite interna-
tional condemnations of its 2007 test, the United States and the in-
ternational community cannot ignore the probability that China will 
be willing to fight in space.218 As the INF Treaty proved incapable 
of preventing Russian development of IRBMs,219 so too will the 
Outer Space Treaty prove incapable of preventing Chinese militari-
zation of space, should China find such actions to be in its own best 
interests.220 The United States ignores these developments at its own 
peril: failure to act in space could leave it outmaneuvered by 
China.221 Faith in Chinese compliance with the Outer Space Treaty 
could lead to a devastating result for the United States and its allies 
in a future war.222 While the United States’ withdrawal from the 
Outer Space Treaty could directly lead to an outer space arms race, 
such a conclusion would be preferable to Chinese military domina-
tion of the ultimate high ground. 
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CONCLUSION 
The muted international reactions to American withdrawal from 
the ABM and INF Treaties show that the United States should not 
let such concerns stand in the way of an effective Space Force. With-
drawal from the Outer Space Treaty makes political and military 
sense. The United States has a unique opportunity to develop a new 
military focus on space as the Department of Defense establishes the 
new Space Force. Without withdrawal from or violations of the 
Outer Space Treaty, the Space Force will be unable to amount to 
anything more significant than a restructuring of currently existing 
capabilities and will do little to improve national security relative to 
the costs of its creation. Should the United States withdraw, how-
ever, the Space Force can provide offensive and defensive military 
capabilities that no other service can offer and ensure that the United 
States is able to protect its interests in space as new adversaries, like 
China, seek to claim the high ground over which the United States 
has previously held a unique influence. 
